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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1979
No. 79-886

THE UPJOHN COMPANY, ET AL.,
Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL ..
Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF THE FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION
AS AMICUS CURIAE
The Federal Bar Association,
with the consent of the parties, submits
this Brief as amicus curiae in support of
Petitioners.

QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether conmunications between
employees of a corporation and an attor ney representing that corporation are
entitled to the full protections of the
attorney-client privilege only when the
employees are those responsible -for deciding and directing the corporation's
response to the attorney's legal advice.

INTEREST OF THE FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION
The Federal Bar Association is a
professional association of approximately
14,000 lawyers and judges, the majority o
whom are now or have been in service to the
Federal Government.

The Association is

dedicated to advancing the science of
jurisprudence and promoting the administration of justice and the highest quality
representation before the Courts, departments, and agencies of the United States.
- 2 -

The parties to this case necessarily must focus upon the facts and the
law in the context of their own interests
and the particular circumstances of this
case.

But the question of the extent to

which the attorney-client privilege protects connnunications between attorneys
and their corporate clients implicates
interests transcending the specific and
narrow interests of Petitioners and
Respondents in this litigation.

The

bedrock of the privilege is the nature
of legal representation itself, and the
constriction upon the privilege adopted
below may influence the practice of law
in a way contrary to the public's inte'

rest in the sound administration of justice and transaction of business by
public institutions.

The restrictive test

for determining the extent of the attor-

- 3 -

ney-client privilege, embraced by the
Court below, may impede effective and
responsible legal representation of
Federal agencies as well as corporations.
This Brief will focus upon
these broad adverse consequences of the
restrictive test for application of the
attorney-client privilege that was
1/
adopted below.-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The narrow scope of the attorney-client privilege adopted by the Court
below is a disservice to the public's interest in ensuring that public and private
organizations receive responsible legal
counsel for the conduct of their business.

l./

We will not address the question presented
to this Court with respect to whether the work
product doctrine was properly applied in this
case.

- 4 -

Limiting the protections of the attorney-client privilege to communications
with a small number of people at the very
top of an organization ignores the realities of how business is conducted by
institutions today.
nize t

It fails to recog-

t day-to-day business decisions

are made by lower level management and
that the institution's business is conducted by operating personnel.

These

subordinate employees need to receive
confidential legal counsel by attorneys
fully knowledgeable in all facts pertinent to the subject matter of the legal
advice.

Denying the attorney-client

privilege to attorneys' coIIDllunications
with such employees will impede this flow
of information and legal advice critical
to the lawful conduct of modern business.
Facts of pertinence to operation of public and private institutions

- 5 -

are possessed firsthand generally by subordinate personnel, not by those few members at the very top of the organization
in its control group.

The control group

test presents a most unfair choice to
attorneys and their organization clients
-- either to investigate the facts fully
from such subordinate personnel and
thereby incur the risk that such facts
will be susceptible to discovery from
counsel, or to decline to investigate
comprehensively and thereby render legal
advice upon less than the complete factual
picture.

Moreover, even if the choice is

made to interview subordinate personnel,
these employees, knowing that their communfcations are not confident~al, may
naturally be reluctant to speak candidly.
The net effect will be to make it more
difficult to assure that an organization's
- 6 -

business is conducted in conformity with
the law.
The narrow test adopted by the
Court below conflicts with common-law
principles sustaining application of the
attorney-client privilege to communications with an attorney by an agent of
the client.
§

E.g., 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence

2317, at 618 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961).

The decision below clashes with the decisions of many State courts of this
Nation that have followed this common-law
rule.

It clashes with the decisions of

the Seventh and Eighth Circuits that have
accorded greater protection to conmrunications between subordinates of an organization and the organization's counsel.
Harper & Row Publisher, Inc. v. Decker,
423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970) (per curiam),
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 400
U.S. 348 (1971); Diversified Industries,
- 7 -

Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 606 (8th
Cir. 1977) (en bane).

The broader test of

Diversified Industries should be adopted
by this Court as the rule best accormnodating all competing interests and thus
most desirable "in the light of reason
and experience."

Rule 501, Federal

Rules of Evidence.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE NARROW, "CONTROL GROUP" TEST FOR
APPLYING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE TO COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN
ATTORNEYS AND THEIR CORPORATE CLIENTS
WILL IMPEDE EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION
OF SUCH CLIENTS, CONTRARY TO THE
PUBLIC INTEREST.
A.

Effective And Responsible Legal
Representation Of Any Client Begins With The Attorney Investigating An · Discovering All Pertinent Facts That May Be~r Upon The
Matter Upon Which The Client Has
Requested Legal Ad~ice. ------~~election, analys :·.s, and under-

standing of the facts he or she professionally regards as pertinent is the law- 8 -

yer's invariable first step in serving the
interests of his or her client.

See, e.g.,

D. Binder & S. Price, Legal Interviewing
and Counseling:

A Client-Centered Ap-

proach 3 (1977); B. Shawcross, The Funetions and Responsibilities of an Advocate
16 (1958); Justice Jackson, The Advocate:
Guardian of Our Traditional Liberties, 36
A.B.A.J. 607, 610 (1950); see also L.
Patterson & E. Cheatham, The Profession
of Law 66 (1971).

Such analysis of facts

is an integral part of the legal evaluation process; and indeed it lies at the
very heart of the attorney-client relationship:
"A client must feel free to
discuss whatever he wishes
with his lawyer and a lawyer
must be equally free to obtain information beyond that
volunteered by his client.
A lawyer should be fflly
informed of all the acts of · ·
the matter he is handling in
order for his client to obtain
the full advantage of our legal
- 9 -

s~stem. It is for the lawyer in
t e exercise of his independent
profes·sional jud·S $ent to setarate
the relevant and 1mp·o·r tant ·rom
the irr·e !evant and unimpo·r tant.
The observance of the ethical
obligation of a lawyer to hold
inviolate the confidences and
secrets of his client not only
facilitates the full development of facts essential to
proper representation of the
client but also encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance."
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility,
Ethical Consideration 4-1 (emphasis added) ;
see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,
511 (1947); ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 3-5.
It is natural and inevitable for a lawyer,
and an element in the exercise of his or
her professional skill, to gather, assimilate, and analyze facts objectively before
assuming the role of either counselor or
advocate.

In dispute resolution cases,

for example, prospective litigants generally will not themselves know what, if .
- 10 -

any, claims or defenses they may have and
will come to a lawyer, present all facts,
and let the lawyer decide which facts may
be pertinent to legally sound claims or
defenses.

Only until initially con-

front.ing all the facts impartially can
advocates competently tender partisan
counsel regarding which claims or defenses are possible, which are likely to
succeed, and which are likely to fail.
This process can only be achieved through
objective analysis of all the total factual circumstances made known to counsel
and further disclosed by counsel's investigative efforts to learn the facts.
As this Court has long held,
the very purpose of the attorney-client
privilege is to facilitate this first
stage of effective legal representation,
learning the facts.

E.g., Chirac v.

Reinicker, 24 U.S. 474, 477, 11 Wheat.
,,

- 11 -

280, 294 (1826); Blackburn v . ·crawford' s
Lessee, 70 U.S. 186, 193, 3 Wall . 175,
192-193 (1865); Connecticut Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 458
(1876); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464,
470 (1888); Alexander v. United States,
138 U.S. 353, 358 (1891); United States
v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S.
318, 336 (1915); Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).

The privilege

is society's recognition that, without
the protection the privilege accords, a
client may be reluctant to share with
even his or her attorney all the facts
possessing possible relevance to the
client's legal problem.

The restrictive

test for protecting counnunications of the
corporate .client unnecessarily derogates
this societal incentive to effective
legal representation.

- 12 -

B.

The Narrow, "Control Group" Test
For Applying The Attorney-Client
Privilege To Corporations Will
Inhibit The Full Investigation
And Discovery Of All Facts Bearing Upon The Matter Upon Which
The Corporate Client Needs Lega1
Advice.
"The concept of the privilege

to encourage consultation with an attorney to assure lawful conduct is as important to the corporat1 n as it is to a
natural person.

Both need legal advice

and representation and it is in the
public interest that they have it."

M.

Ladd & R. Carlson, Cases and Materials on
Evidence 335 (1972).

What approach to

the attorney-client privilege best implements this policy of encouraging lawful
conduct?

Clearly, a rule is necessary

that accords more protection than the
narrow, restrictive control group test
adopted by the Court below.
A relatively unimpeded flow of

- 13 -

information and legal advice is critical
to the lawful conduct of modern business.
The complexity and wide-ranging scope of
laws intended to regulate business
affairs necessitate the rendering of uninhibited legal counsel to assure that
the day-to-day operation of the business
is in full compliance with the law.

See

Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F.Supp.
136, 144 (D. Del. 1977), quoting United ·
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89
F.Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950); Note,
The Attorney-Client Privilege and the
Corporation in Shareholder Litigation, 50
S. Cal. L. Rev. 303, 306, 309 (1977).
Increasing involvement of corporate
counsel in the day-to-day business affairs
of the corporation will further the public
interest by making it easier to plan
corporate affairs to avoid litigation.
See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D.
- 14 -

508, 513 (D.Conn. 1976).

In situations

potentially or actually involving litigation, an unimpeded flow of information
enables the corporate attorney to interview employees in order to determine
exactly what happened and to guage the
various facets of the case.

Weinschel,

Corporate Employee Interviews and the
Attorney Client Privilege, 12 B.C. Ind.

& Com. L. Rev. 873 (1971).
Limiting the attorney-client
privilege to conm1unications with those
at the very top of the corporate pyramid
frustrates these objectives.

The control

group test ignores the fact that middle
management executives, while not having
the final word in major corporate issues,
nevertheless play a major role in the
decisionmaking process.

Their advice may

be sought by upper echelon executives, or
they may in fact make decisions which are
- 15 -

only summarily approved by their superiors, or which need not be reviewed
by their superiors at all.
supra at 876.

Weinschel,

Manifestly these mid-level

managers need to be able to communicate
freely with corporate counsel as part of
this decisionmaking process.

In addition,

because middle level executives and other
subordinate corporate employees may often
engage in acts for which corporate liability is sought, there is an obvious
necessity for these individuals to communicate with corporate counsel.

Indeed,

if a corporate employee has the power to
render the corporation liable for damages,
should he not also have the power to make
a confidential communication to, and receive confidential legal advice from, the
company's counsel?

See Note, Applica-

bility of the Attorney-Client Privilege
to Corporate Communications, 48 U. Cin .
- 16 -

L. Rev. 819, 822-823 (1979); McLaughlin,
The Treatment of Attorney Client and Re ~
lated Privileges in the Proposed Rules of
Evidence for the United States District
Courts, 26 The Record 30, 33 (1971).

See

also Diversified Industries, Inc. v.
Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 608-609 (8th Cir.
1977) (en bane); Rule 801(d)(2)(D),
Federal Rules of Evidence.
In corporations, those possessing firsthand knowledge of the facts upon
which responsible legal advice must be
based are not likely to be those
representatives of the corporation found
in the control group, but rather those
mid-level managers and operating personnel
in the company whose jobs are to conduct
the day-to-day business of the company.
See, e.g., Diversified Industries,
supra at 608-609; In re Ampicillin Anti- 17 -

trust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 385-387
(D.D.C. 1978); Duplan Corp. v. Deering
Milliken, Inc., 397 F.Supp. 1146, 11641165 (D.S.C. 1974).

In antitrust and

patent cases, for example, generally much
of the critical sales and technical information necessary for responsible
litigation or corporate counseling would
be known only by the marketing and engineering "line" people -- not the members of the company's board of directors.
The evils of the narrow, control group test are that it presents unfair choices to attorneys and their
corporate clients, and may prevent effective and responsible representation of
corporations and frustrate attempts by
corporations and their counsel to ensure
that corporate action is taken in conformity with the law.

When faced with

the need to discover facts upon which to
- 18 -

render legal advice to the corporate
client, counsel operating under the
restrictions of the control group test
must elect either to interview corporate
representatives who are not in the control group, and thereby learn the facts
but incur the risk that the attorney may
be compelled to disclose these facts
publicly because the interviews are not
privileged; or to decline to interview
these employees and render advice upon
less than all the facts.

Indeed, even in

those occasions in which counsel and his
corporate client choose to incur the risk
of disclosure and proceed to interview employees who are not in the control group,
such employees may be less than candid
with counsel since they will not be speaking with any expectation that what they
say will remain confidential.
Furthermore, the narrow, control

- 19 -

group test may mean that corporate employees not in the control group -- those midlevel managers and operating people closest to the daily business of the corporation -- may be deprived of legal advice
with respect to the conduct of their
day-to-day operations.

Corporate counsel

may be reluctant to provide such advice
knowing that it is not confidential legal
advice.

If, for example, corporate coun-

sel were to observe business practices as
to which there conceivably might be a
question of liability under the antitrust
laws, counsel may be reluctant to point
out ways in which the practices might be
altered to resolve any doubt that they are
prohibited under the antitrust laws, for
fear that by doing so in a nonprivileged
connnunication counsel will be flagging the
problem and increasing the risk that legal
action will be taken against his or her client.
- 20 -

Under the view of the privilege
adopted by the Court below, even when
legal advice is rendered directly to the
control group, the restrictive notion of
privilege may deny the benefits of that
advice to those who are not in the control group.

To be effective, connnunica-

tions from corporate counsel often require distribution within the company so
that the advice may be effectuated.

With

the control group test, however, communications to others "down the chain of
command" which relay or are based upon
legal advice may constitute a publication
waiving the attorney-client privilege.
See, e .:A:., Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686,
693 (10th Cir. 1968).

Under the circum-

stances, members of the control group, and
their attorneys, may naturally be reluctant to communicate fully with lower level
employees with respect to the subject
- 21 -

matter of the legal advice.

The result

will be diminished effectivPriess in determining the corporation's response to
legal advice.
In this regard, reducing the
scope of the protection accorded corporations by the privilege will deter use
by corporations of counsel to seek out and
correct corporate wrongdoing.

Any loss

of this self-policing by corporations,
with the alternatives being either absence of detection or detection by governmental agencies at a cost to the public
fisc, is certainly not in the public
interest.

See Diversified Industries,

supra at 610; Note, The Attorney-Client
Privilege, the Self-Evaluative Report
Privilege and Diversified Industries, Inc.
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v. Meredith, 40 Ohio St. L.J. 699, 713

2/

(1979).-

The narrow, control group test
conflicts with generally accepted, commonlaw principles concerning the proper appl i cation of the attorney-client privilege.
In general, the privilege has been recognized to safeguard the confidentiality of
communications made by agents of a client,
for the client's benefit, to the client's

2/ The use of lawyers to conduct analyses and
reviews similar to that conducted by the
attorneys for Petitioners in this case is common
both to the Government and to private industry
alike. See,~, In re Grand Jury Subpoena,
599 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1979) (retention by corporation of outside law ' firm to conduct fnvestigation and render advice regarding possible
illegal payments to foreign officials by employees of the corporation); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979) (same);
"Westinghouse Seeks End to Cloud Caused By Sui ts
Over Uranium Supply Contracts", Wall Street
Journal, June 7, 1978, at 17, col. 1 (same);
"Civil Service Hires Lawyer To Study Alleged
Abuses", N.Y. Times. Nev. 5, 1977, at 8, col. 6
(retention of att0rney "to conduct a 'comprehensive and independent inquiry"' into alleged
abuses withi:a the Civil Service Commission);
(continued on next page)
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counsel.

E.g., 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence

3/
§ 2317, at 618 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961);
(continued from page 22)
Diversified Industries, supra (retention by
corporation of outside counsel to conduct an investigation and report to the board of directors
concerning allegations of the commission of
bribery by employeee of the corporation); Herlihy
& Levine, Corporate Crisis: The Overseas Payment
Problem, 8 Law & Pol. Int'!. Bus. 547, 586-587
(1976) (retention by corporations of outside coun- .
sel to conduct independent investigations of
possible management fraud); SEC Current Report,
Form 8-K, Cities Service Co., Comm'n File No.
1-1093, at 1, 3, 5-6 (Sept. 1975) (retention by
corporation of outside counsel to investigate
possible illegal payments to foreign political
entities and other illegal accumulations or use
of corporate funds); CBS, Inc., "Report of
Counsel, Investigation of Prize Money Descriptions With Respect to the 'Heavyweight Championship of Tennis' Matches" (July 1, 1977) (retention by corporation of outside counsel to
conduct an investigation and report to management concerning allegations that tennis matches
that were advertised and promoted as involving
prize money to be awarded on a "winner-take-all"
basis in fact involved prize money to be awarded
proportionately to the losers as well as to the
winners) (Report on file at Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D.C.).

1/

"The client's freedom of communication requires
a liberty of employing other means than his own
personal action. The privilege of confidence
would be a vain one unless its exercise could be
thus delegated. A communication, then, by ?ny
form of agency employed or set in motion by the
client is within the privilege.
(continued on next page)
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Annot., Evidence: Attorney-Client Privi lege as Applicable to Cormnunications Between Attorney and Client 's Agent, Employee, Spouse, or Relative, 139 A.L.R.
1250, 1251 (1942).

So, too, employees of

the corporation not in the control group
should be entitled to speak confidentially
to counsel for their principal, the corporate client.

English authority has held

corranunications between all company employees and company counsel to be protected
by the attorney-client privilege when the
corranunications relate to the subject
matter as to which the company is seeking

,.

legal advice.

E.g., Wilson v. Northhamp-

ton & Banbury Junction Ry., 14 Eq~ity
(continued from page 24)
"This of course includes connnunications through
an interpreter, and also communications through
a messenger or any other agent of transmission,
a~ well as co~imuni cations originating with the
client's agent and made to the attorney."
(Emphasis in original; f ootnotes omitted.)
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Cases 477, 484 (1872).

In this country,

the great majority of the State courts
that have considered the question have
adhered to this "English Rule" and have
not confined the attorney-client privilege to the select few members of an organization's control group.

See, e.g.,

Jay v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 340 So.2d
456, 457 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976); D.I.
Chadbourne Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal.
2d 723, 388 P.2d 700, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468
(L964); Bingham v. Walk, 128 Ind. 164, 27
N.E. 483 (1891); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers
Manufacturing Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188
A.2d 125 (1963); Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. Flennning, 78 Ga. 733, 3 S.E. 420
(1887); Schmitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547,
2 N.W.2d 413 (1942); Riddle Spring Realty
Co. v. State, 107 N.H. 271, 220 A.2d 751
(1966); State v. Kociolek, 23 N.J. 400i
129 A.2d 417 (1957); Ford Motor Go. v.
- 26 -

O.W. Burke Co., 59 Misc.2d 543, 299 N.Y.S.
2d 946 (Sup.Ct. 1969); In re Hyde, 149
Ohio 407, 79 N.E.2d 224 (1948); Gass v.
Baggerly, 332 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Ct.Civ. App.
1960); Horlick's Malted Milk Co. v.
A. Spiegel Co., 155 Wis. 201, 144 N.W.
272 (1913); contra Shere v. Marshall
Field & Co., 26 Ill.App.3d 728, 327 N.E.

4/

2d 92 (1974).-

This rule recognizing the

!!._/ Six states, by statute, have modified this
common-law rule in their jurisdictions by adopting Rule 502(a)(2) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974), which defined "representative of
the client" in "control group" terms, i.e., as
"one having authority to obtain professional
legal services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client." 3A Ark.
Stat. Ann. § 28-1001, Rule 502(a)(2); Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann., Maine Rules of Evidence, Rule 502;
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 49.075; N.D. Rules of Evidence,
Rule 502; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2502; S.D.
Rules of Evidence§ 19-13-2. This definition of
"representative of the client" appeared in the
Preliminary Draft of the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969), but was eliminated
by the Advisory CoDDDittee from the 1972 Final
Draft of the Proposed Rules that was approved by
this Court in 1972. No definition of "representative of the client" was contained in the
Rules approved by this Court. See Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence
503; see also 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Wein~
stein,;-Evidence 1 503[03] (1979).
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need for corporate clients to speak con fidentially, through agents, to cor porat e
counsel was incorporated in model codes
of evidence promulgated in 1942 and 1953.
American Law Institute, Model Code of
Evidence. Rule 209 (1942); National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform St hte
Laws, Uniform Rules of Ev idence, Rule 26( 3)
(1953).

And, of course, the Seventh

and Eighth Circuits have applied broader ,
subject matter tests for the application
of the privilege to corporations, rather
than the narrow, control group test
adopted by the Sixth Circuit below.
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v . Decker,
423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) .
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 400
U.S. 348 (1971); Diversified Indus t ries ,
5/
supra.
5/ For several decisions of District Court s applying the "subject matter" test, see Pet i t i oners '
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8, note 1 .
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The Court below afforded scant
discussion of its rationale for rejecting
the broader, subject matter test consonant with these common-law principles.
It assumed that, if the subject matter
test were adopted, corporate members of
the control group -- those at the very top
of the corporation -- inevitably would
seize upon that test in order "to shield
themselves from information about possibly
illegal transactions."

United States v .

•

Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 (6th Cir.
1979).

The Court hypothesized that the

control group would purposely insulate itself from the "full details" of the transaction which is the subject of the legal
advice; and that corporate counsel thus
would be "the exclusive repository of unpleasant facts," which would remain "undiscoverable."

Id.

The Court's reasoning is an in - 29 -

adequate justification for so restricting
the attorney-client privilege as applied
to organizations.

Even if the control

group chose to act in the manner suggested by the Court below -- an unduly
harsh assumption concerning the bona
fides of high level corporate and agency
officials -- the Court's concern that all
facts would reside, undiscoverable, only
with counsel, does not follow.

The

attorney~client privilege, properly a p plied, would not prevent inquiry directly
of the corporate employees whom corporate
counsel had interviewed; nor would it prevent discovery directly from the corporation of pertinent documentary evidenc e
(other than written communications with
counsel).

E.g., 4 Moore's Federal Prac - 30 -

tice 1 26.60[2], at 26-233 to -234 (2d
6/
ed. 1979).- Nor would it allow such
documentary evidence to be shielded from
disclosure by funnelling the evidence to

E.g., Grant v. United

corporate counsel.

States, 227 U.S. 74, 79 (1913); Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320
F.2d 314, 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 929 (1963).

The privilege would

only prevent the unseemly scenario of
corporate counsel becoming unwilling witnesses and sources of evidence against
their clients.

See Hickman v. Taylor,

329 U.S. 495, 516-518 (1947) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).

6/ The Court below concluded that, in this case,
the burden of this discovery from sources other
than corporate counsel would be "severe." While
this may be true in the particular circumstanc es
of this case, this condition is hardly an adequate
justification for enunciating a rule of general
application which discounts the ability of a discovering party to obtain information from sources
other than corporate counsel without doing violence to the attorney-client privilege.
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We submit that the approach of
the Eighth Circuit in Diversified I ndustries provides sufficient protection for
the interests served by the attorneyclient privilege while simultaneously
recognizing the need for appropriate
discovery in litigation.

The Diversified

Court held that communications between
all co~porate employees and corporate
counsel may be privileged if "(1 ) the
communication was made for the purpose 0 f
securing legal a dvice; (2) the employee
making the communication did so a t the
direction of his corporate sup erior ; ( 3)
the superior made the request so that the
corporation could secure legal advice; (4)
the subject matter of the communication is
within the scope of the emp loyee ' s corporate duties; and (5) the commun ication is
not disseminated beyond tho se persons who,
because of the corporate structure, need
- 32 -

to know its contents."
tries, supra at 609.

Diversified IndusSee also 2 J. Wein-

stein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence

1 503(b) [04] (1979}.

The Diversified

test provides a protection that is more
in tune with the legal needs of corporations and of the role of the corporate
attorney today.

We urge that it be

adopted by this Court.
II.

THE NARROW, "CONTROL GROUP" TEST FOR
APPLYING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE SHOULD BE REJECTED BECAUSE IT
WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THE REPRESENTATION OF FEDERAL AGENCIES.
The structure and operation of

Federal agencies make them as subject as
corporations to the pernicious consequences of the restrictive "control group"
test for defining the limits of the
attorney-client privilege.

This is an

additional reason why this test should
not be approved by this Court.
- 33 -

Agencies, like corporations,
are not characterized by one, small group
of upper-level managers conducting the
agencies' day-to-day business.

Decision-

making authority is decentralized and diffused, so that the day-to-day decisions
are made by middle and lower level
management.

See, e.g., Wallace, A New

Test for Management by Objectives, 2 The
Bureaucrat 362, 366 (1974); W. Gellhorn &

C. Byse, Administrative Law 103 & n.9,
109 (5th ed. 1970); H. Hensel & J. Millett,
Departmental Management in Federal Administration 33-35, 42 (1949); see also P.
Drucker, Management:

Tasks, Responsi-

bilities, Practices 136 (1974).

There

simply is no readily identifiable "control
group" of upper management wi th the expertise and time to direct all individual
facets of the day-to-day affairs of the
agency.

Nor would it be a desirable system

for managing the agencies if there were.
- 34 -

See Drucker, supra at 555 ("[a] structure
that forces decisions to go to the highest
possible level of organization rather than
be settled at the lowest possible level is
clearly an impediment").
This realistic view of how
agencie~ are managed dictates that there
be assurance that agency counsel may
freely and effectively advise middle
management and other subordinate employees without the inhibitions that will
attend if the control group test is at
play.

Agency lawyers, like their corpo-

rate counterparts, should not have to
confront the Robson's choice of foregoing
complete oral or written corrnnunications
with middle level managers or operating
personnel, for fear that the substance of
these communications will not be privileged, and thereby basing their legal advice upon incomplete data, or engaging in
- 35 -

such corrnnunications and thereby incurring
the risk of subsequent disclosure.
Middle level managers and other subordinate agency personnel must n

~

f eel in-

hibited by fear that corrnnunications are
not privileged; they must be free to be
candid with their counsel, to share all
facts with their attorneys, so that
agency counsel may render responsible
legal advice, based upon all pertinent
data, to these employees, as well as to
those at the top of the agency management.
And we should expect no less if our
agency decisions are to have rational
bases.

See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
The control group test will

also adversely impact upon agencies in
litigative contexts .

All the facts which

need to be known by attorneys representing agencies are not known, fir sthand, by
the small control group of managers at the
- 36 -

very head of the agency.

They may be

known by middle level managers and operating people.

This is a fact of life

common to agencies as well as cor~orations; and the restriction of the
attorney-client privilege solely to communications from the control group would
hamper effective litigation counseling
and representation in court.

Agencies

and corporations alike would experience
the same inhibitions chilling frank disclosure to attorneys; there would be the
prospect of attorneys, by conscious decision or by the foFce of this reluctance
of agency employees to speak frankly,
furnishing legal representation with less
than complete knowledge and understanding
of the controversy.
Should this Court affirm the
decision below, the spectre of lower courts
applying the control group test to Federal
- 37 -

agencies is not a fanciful one.

Courts

have recognized the similarities between
agencies and corporations, and have
accordingly applied the same rules or
tests for each when applying the attorney-client privilege.

See, e.g., Hearn

v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 579 (E.D. Wash.
1975); see also Coastal States Gas Corp.
v. United States Department of Energy,
No. 79-2181, slip op. at 15 (D.C. Cir.
Feb. 15, 1980); Mead Data Central, Inc.
v. United States Department of the Air
Force, 566 F.2d 242, 254 n.25 (D.C. Cir .
1977).

Unless this Court expressly in-

structs .otherwise, the similarities in
the structure and operation of corporations and Federal agencies are so great
that lower courts may find no logical
distinction precluding application of the
control group test to agencies.

The ad-

verse consequences of the contro l group
- 38 -

test thus would be compounded, for the
negative impact upon Federal agencies,
charged with service in the public interest, would be injurious to the Nation.
To the extent the control group test
would influence negatively the rendering
of effective and responsible counsel to
Federal agencies, the American public
· would be the loser.
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-

--

. . . ____....

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the
decision of the Court of Appeals should be
reversed insofar as it adopts the ''control
group" test for the application of the
attorney-client privilege, and the cause
remanded with instructions that the
Court apply the standard adopted in
Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith,
572 F.2d 596, 606 (8 t h Cir. 1977) (en bane).
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